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Trade Policy Under Endogenous Credibility
ABSTRACT
Becausetrade liberalization which is anticipated to be temporary creates a
divergence between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate
of interest, tariff—reduction in the presence of international financial asset
trade may reduce welfare for a small country. Calvo has argued that even
though the government intends to liberalize trade permanently, if the private
sector believes with some probability that a tariff will be imposed in the
future, then free trade may not be optimal. This paper first formalizes this
argument and discusses the optimal policy for a qovernTrnt which seeks to
maximize representative household welfare. The government's lack of
credibility is represented by a set of beliefs the private sector holds about
the type of government it faces. Next, beliefs are endcenized by allc,riing the
private sector to update thesi using Bayes' rule. In one approach, the true
government's objective is maximize welfare for the economy, so that it does not
seek to imitate another type, in contrast with other recent medels of policy
credibility. With learning, the government eventually adopts free trade, even
though restricted trade is optimal initially.
CharlesEngel Kenneth Kletzer
Departmentof Economics Economic Growth Center
Rouss Hall Yale University
University of Virginia New Haven, CT 06520
Charlottesville, VA 229011. Introduction
Trade liberalization which is anticipated to be temporary creates a
thfference between the effective domestic rate of interest and the world rate
of interest.In some recent papers, Calvo (1985, 19b) hasdemonstratedthe
second—best result that temporary trade liberalization, even in the absence of
market power or distortions, may reduce welfare for a small country.(Froot
(1986) demonstrates a similar result.) Because a tariff will be relinposed in
the future, there is an intertemporal distortion when financial assets can be
traded internationallywhich maydominate the welfare-increasing effects of
temporarytariffreduction.
In another paper, Calvo (1986a)has argued that even thoughthe
government intends to liberalize tradepermanently, ifthe private sector
believes with some probability thata tariff willbeimposedin the future,
thenfree trade may not be optimal. Calvo takes the beliefs of the private
sector as given exogenously.
In this paper we first formalize Calvo's argument and discuss the optimal
policy for a government which seeks to maximize a representative household's
welfare.The government's lack of credibility with the private sector is
representedby a set of beliefs which the household holdsabout the type of
governmentit faces. The households perceive the possibility of two types of
governments, one of which is the true one. We assume that there is a single
false type, which is believed to select a tariff with a positive probability.
1Households choose their cons.mption aixi saving plans to maximize expected
utility, wherethe expectation is takenover the policies of the two types of
governments, given their prior beliefs about the probabilities of which type
they face.The true government also maximizes household expected utility;
however, it knows its type, so that the expectation istakenusing this
information. The government would ideally always choose free trade. Because
theirpolicyobjectivesareincredible,tariffimposition(i.e.,
non-liberalization)mayleadto a higher level of household utility than free
trade.
We next endogenize learning by allowing the private sector to update its
beliefs usingBayes' rule. C)urapproach is somewhat similar to thattakenby
BackusandDriffill (1985,1986), Barro arid Gordon (1983), and Barro (1986) in
their analyses of monetary policy. However, in our modelthetrue
government' sobjective is th maximizewelfare for the economy rather than some
arbitraryfunction.Furthermore, the true government does not increase its
payoff by imitating another type --ourequilibrium isnot the Kreps-Wilson
reputationaltype.The true government' a payoff is greater the larger is the
probabilityperceived.by the private sector thattheyfacethetrue type.
Inthe presence of learning, Calvo's casefornon—liberalization is much
weaker.If a government is committed to maximizing welfare, then we show
first that with learning, the private sector must be more skeptical initially
(than without learning) for a tariff to be superiorto freetrade. We also
show that there is an upper boundon the numberof periods inwhich a tariff
willbe chosen by the welfare maximizing government.
Section 2 presents a simple two-period model with a single consumption
good.Calvo'sargument is developed in the absence of learning.Learning
zabout the government's type is introduced in section 3.In the single
consumable model, there are no atemporaleffectsof trade policy. Section 4
adds a secondconsumptiongoodanda static welfare gain from free trade. The
model isalso extended beyond twotimeperiods. Section5concludes.
2.A Two-Period ModelWithoutLearning
Theeffects of private sector incredibilityabout theobjectives of the
government are introduced in a simple two—period model of a small open
economy.Thereis a single importedconsumption good, which isnot produced
athome, and an export good (manna)whichis not used domestically and is
available in an exogenously fixed supply each period. The private sector is
represented by a single household which maximizes the expectation of a
discounted sum of utility of current consumption.The discount rate is
constantandequal to the world rate of interest.
Thegovernment's only role is to set trade policy and reditribute any
tariff revenue in a lump-sum fashion. The government seeks to maximize the
welfare of the representative household.However the government lacks
credibility with the private sector:the household believes thatthe
governmentis the true welfare-maximizing one with positive probability less
than unity. For simplicity, we assume thatthehousehold believes the only
alternative possibility is a government which adopts the rule:impose a
tariff next period with probability q, or choose free trade for the next
period with probability (1—q).
Because we will introduce learning by the household about the
3government's true type, we restrict the policies which can be chosen in any
period to afinite set. Otherwise, if the government selects a policy which
haszero probability of being chosen by the alternative government, then the
government's type will be fully revealed. For simplicity only two policies
are assumed to be available —-freetrade or a fixed positive tariff rate.
Furthennore,taxes on foreign borrowingorcapitalcontrolsare unavailable
(see below).
Theexport goodis chosen as numeraire. The representative household's
utilityisgiven by:
U(c1,c2)V(c1) +/3E(V(c2)),
where c1 and c2 are consumption in periods 1 and 2, respectively.V(c) is
twice continously differentiable, increasing and concave and 3 is the discount
factor. V' (c) approaches infinity as consumption falls to zero and approaches
zero as consumption rises toward infinity. The expectation is taken over the
beliefs of the household about the government's type and respective behavior
in period 2.
Thehouseholdhasaccess to aninternationalcapital market, in which it
canborrow or lend at given rate of interest, r. Any debt incurred in period
1 mustbe repaidin fullin period2. Weassumethat thehousehold's rate of
thscountequals the world rate of interest, so that /3(1+r). Units for
the itnportables and exportables are chosen so that their free trade priceis
unityand the relative price of the import in terms of the export cum tariff
is p > 1.
Thehousehold solves







where1isthe subjective probability thatthetariffwillbe imposedin
period2,p1 is the relative price of the import goodinperiod1,and and
arethe lump—sum transfers of period 1 and period 2tariff revenue,
respectively.If p1 is one, thenis zero. Planned consumption in period 2
is given by c2 in the event a tariff is imposed inthe secondperiod and by c2
in the event of free trade in the second period.The first period current
accountdeficit is given by x, and y is the amount of manna available each
period.
Thehousehold equilibrhun conditionsare:
(1) V' (c1) (lip1) V' (lip) + (1—1r)V' (C2)
(2) c1 + c2/(1+r) =y(l+ 1/(1+r)), and
(3)
The equilibrium conditions R1(p1-1)c1 and R2(p-1)2have been used in
the second and third equations.
The government chooses trade policy in each period tomaximizehousehold
welfare,whichis expected utility.However, the government knows its true
type, sothat itsobjective function is
W =V(c1)+ /3V(c2).
Inthesecondperiod, the true government is indifferent between free trade
and a tariff because there is no static tariff distortion in this special
5model.There are only intertemporal thsthrtions in thepresenceof
international assettradinginducedbythe government's lack of credibility.
We will assumethatthe true government always chooses free trade in period2,
because thischoice would always be optimal in the last periodfora small
countryif there were multiple consumption goods.The subjective probability
that the tariff is imposed in period 2, 7r, is the product of the probability
that the false government imposes the tariff, q, and the perceived probability
that the government is the false type, (1—X).
The true government's problem is to choose p, from the set {1,p) to
maximize the value of W, given the resultant expected utility maximizing
consumption behavior of the household. Equation (1) implies that if 71 exceeds
zero and free trade is selected in the first period, then consumption in
period 1 exceeds y and consumption in period 2 is less than y. That is, the
country borrows from abroad since the effective market rate of interest faced
by the household is less than the world rate' of interest.
If 71 is zero, then free trade in the first period (p1 =1)achieves the
first-best allocation of consumption over periods, and if iT is unity then the
tariff achieves the first-best. In both these cases, the intertemporal terms
of trade for the household are identical to the foreign terms, (1+r), so that
there is no intertemporal distortion and consumption is the same in each
period. Whenis between zero and one, there is a welfare loss due to the
intertemporal distortion created by the government's lack of credibility under
either free trade of the tariff.
In this model, any policy which brings the effective rate of interest for
households into equality with the world rate it' interest eliminates the
intertemporal distortion and achieves the first-best outcome. One such policy
6is an intermediate tariffwhichyields a domestic relative price of the
importable between one arid p. However, our motivation is the problem of trade
liberalization when the private sector is skeptical about the government's
resolve to stay with the liberal regime.If the private sector assesses
probability ir to a return to the old status quo and probability 1—U that
whatever liberalized regime is chosen will be maintained, then our set—up is a
simple representation of the optimizing government's problem.The two
possibilities perceived by households are simply normalized to yield relative
prices,1 or p. Therefore, we excludethe .-il.j.Itythatthe true
government can select a tariff rate other than one of the two rates the false
governmentmightselect.
Other policies which alleviate the intertemporal distortion are capital
controls, as noted by Calvo (1985). An optimal policy is to impose a tax on
foreign borrowing (lending) along with free trade (tariff), so that
consumptionis ,just equal across periods..Inthe presence of a static
distortion under a tariff (substitution in productionor consumption), free
tradeand a tax on foreignborrowing of the appropriate magnitude can achieve
a first-bestallocation.For the remainder of this paper, we assume that
capital controls are infeasible, or that taxes on internationalasset
transactions canbe evaded.
The government chooses between free trade and the tariff to maximize
household utility, cognizant of how the household subsequently consumes and
saves. The value of social welfare in the case of free trade in the absence
of learning is given by a function of the household's prior beliefs, U:
(4) W1(U)V(c1) +13V(c2)
such that
7(5) V' (c1) cv' (c2), and
(6) c1 + (1+rY'1o2 =y(1+ (1+r)), where
n(1/p) + (1—fl).
Thefunction q. is the ratio ofthe world market discount factor to the
domesticeffective discount factor and is always less than or equal to one.
W1(ir) achieves a maximin for itequalto zero andismonotonically decreasing
init.Tosee this, note that differentiation of equations (4), (5) and (6)
yields:
dW1/dlr [V' (c1)—V' (c2)]V' (c2)((1/p)—1)/[V"(c1) + V"(c2)(1+r)q)].
Equation (5) implies that V' (c1) < V' (ca), so that, with strict concavity of
V(c), dW1/dit < 0, for all it >0.
Social welfare when the tariff is imposed is given by:
(7) W(fl)V(c1)+ /3V(c2)
such that
(8) V1 (c1) =pc'V'(c2), and
(9) c1 + (1+r)c2 y(1 +
where p p.q) ￿ 1. W(ir) achieves a maxiniun when71 equals one and is
monotonically increasing in it.This is derived from differentiation of
equations (7), (8) and (9) which yield
dW/d1r
[V1(c1)—V' (c2)]V' (c2)(1—p)/EV"(c1)+V"(c2)(1+r)pcl.
Since in this case (8) implies that V' (ci) > V1 (ca), dW/dli > 0, for all ir<1.
The values of social welfare are depicted in Figure 1 for both the free
trade and tariff cases. The value of iT, its, such that the two are equal is
greater than one-half. To see this, first note that since the rate oftime
8preference equals the interest rate, and utility is concave, the farther c or
c2 deviate from c1 =c2
=y,the lower is social welfare. When free trade is
chosen in the first periodbythe government, c1 > y arid there is dissaving,
while c2<y. Letuscall the choice of consumption in the first periodunder
freetrade c' ,aridthe choice of consumption in the second period under free
(first period) trade c.From the first order conditions, V' (c' )
(i/2)(1+(1/p))V'(c*). When a tariff is chosen in the first period, thenc1 <
y arid c2 > y. Note that if c were consumed in the first period, and c'were
consumedinthe second period, that the first—order conditions would not be
satisfied. It would be the casethat V (ci) <(1/2)(1+p)V' (c' )
(1/4)(l+p)(1+(1/p))V'(c*) because (i+p)(i+(l/p))(l/4) >1.Therefore, it is
the case that the first period consumption is less than c (because utility is
concave, a lower first—period consumption is needed to achieve the first—order
condition). Hence, when the tariff is imposed at fl 1/2,the consumption
bundleisfarther from the optimum and welfare is lower. Thus at ir1/2,W1
>W and the intersection mustoccurto the right of one-half.
p
If the private secthr's beliefs in period 1 are that the joint
probability of the government being false and imposing a tariff in period 2 is
greater than 7r, then the true optimizing government will impose a tariff in
the first period. Otherwise, free trade in the first period will be optimal.
In the case that q is less thanone-half,free trade will be optimal in period
1for all prior subjective probabilities thatthegovernment is the true type.
Let utility display constant relative risk aversion with the
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to two:
—1
—c
9* * * Inthis case, W1(1) W(U) impliesthatir -—, wherepis the
p
domestic price-cum—tariff of the consumable. For all u > lr*,W1(lr)< W(n),
and for all It<7,W1(ir)> W(17).
3. Two-Period, Single Consumable Model with Learning
We now introduce learning by the private sector about the government's
type using Bayes' Rule. The household upiates its beliefs about the type of
governmentgiven the observation that if thgovernment isthe true one, it
has actedoptimallyin the first period. The updating rules given that free
trade or a tariff is optimal for the true government are straightforward. We
assume thatthegovernment knowsthehousehold's prior beliefs and thatthe
household recognizes that the true government chooses between the tariffand
free trade optimally given the posteriors that will be formed by the
household.
If the parameters of the economy are such that a tariff is optimal for
the first period, then the prior probability that a tariff is imposed in
period 1 is given by
q(l—0) +
where is the prior probability that the government is the true type. This
priorcomes from the facts that true governmentchooses a tariff with
probabilityone (because we aretalking about the case in which a tariff is
optimal) and the false government chooses a tariff withprobability q (it has
the same probability of choosing a tariff in period 1 and period 2). Using
Bayes' rule, the posterior that the government is the true one once it is
10revealed that there is a tariff in place in period 1 is
+X0j.
Therefore,the posterior ir,thesubjective probability thata tariff will be
imposedin period2, in this case is
q(1—1) q21T1q- (i-q)710J,
where wasthe prior probability of a tariff in period2(the subjective
probability of a tariff in period 2 before the tariff in period 1 was revealed
q( 1—X,)). This is because the probability that the true government will
impose a tariff in the second period is zero, while the probability that the
false one will is q.
In other words, households know what the true government would do if it
were in power.They know the parameters of the model, so they know if a
tariff is the optimal choice by the true government if it is in power.In
this case it is optimal to put on a tariff. Prior to observing the tariff
that is actually chosen by the true government, households have some prior
probability that the true government is in power. After it is revealed that a
tariff is imposed in period 1, they update their priors. Consumption
decisions are made in period 1 after the tariff is revealed.Because the
(true) government has full information, they meke their tariff choice in
period 1 knowing how consumers will update their priors.
If the parameters of the economy are such that free trade is optimal in
period 1, then the prior probability that free trade will be observed is
(1—q)(1—X0) +X0.
Theposterior probability that the government is the true one, after having
observed free trade in period 1 is
11+ x0J.
Therefore, the posterior 1, the subjective probability of a tariff being
imposed inperiod2, inthiscase is
q(1-X1)
=
For << q, both arelessthanire. Notethatgfora
given prior 7(o,aslong as A0 exceeds zero.
Therewill be a prior 1(,, call it Il, that gives rise to posteriors such
that W1()W().This is the point where the government is just
indifferent between putting on a tariff or not. For greater prior
probabilities of a tariff it will definitely put on a tariff, and for lesser
prior probabilities it will definitely not put on a tariff. The following
proposition shows that 11> 11. That is, the prior probability that makes them
indifferentbetween putting on a tariffand not with learning isgreater than
theprior probability that made them indifferent without learning.Hence,
withlearning, the household hasto be initially moreskeptical before the
governmentis induced to put on a tariff in period 1.
Proposition1:If 0 < < 1, the prior ir such W1() =
W(1T)
exceeds the
prior7r*suchthat W(7(*) inthe absence of learning.
Proof: If W1() W(i), it is not the casethat 71. only when
q=1/2,but as mentioned above, when 171, q> 1/2.
When7111,thenmax (W1,W) > W(71) W(1(*). Bythe nionotonicity of
W1andW,if n< r, then > W (i)(the coninonvalue of W1 (7*) andW (71*))
anda zerotariff would bechosen and if 1(>7(*,then W >W(17*)anda tariff
wouldbe chosen in period1.
12Hence at the posteriorsand è such that W1() W() both are greater
than W(lr*). In particular, W() > W(lr*), which from monotonicity implies >
7(*Since7(>,fl>1r*.
4. NIodel with Two Consumpon Goods
In the model of the previous sections, there was no atemporal distortion
created by tariffs.The only distortion was in the saving behavior of the
household This arose because the househoild was dubious about. the motives of
the government andperceiveda possible change iir-'Hepolicyin the next
period. Extensionofthe modeltoinclude a static distortion in consumption
fromthe tariff is possible. In such acase, the true government will always
choosefree trade in the last period.For positive values of ir,tariff
imposition in the first period can partially offset the intertemporal
distortion.However, it also introduces an adthtional atemporal welfare
reduction. In the one goodcase, therealwaysexistpossible priorsfor which
choosing the tariff in the first period is superior to free trade (e.g., 1(
1).When thereare two consumption goods, free trade may or may not be a
superior policy for all prior beliefs.
Addinga secondconsumable to ourtwo-periodmodel is straightforward.
For simplicity, the country is coflipletely specialized in production of the
export good, which is taken as numeraire.Output of the exportable is
exogenous and constant, and both the importable and exportable are consumed.
Householdutility is again intertemporally separable, arid the discount rateis
equal tothe given world rate of interest. We write the utility of current
consumption in indirect form and assumethatunits are chosen so that the
13world relative price of the importable is unity.
Becausefree trade will always bechosen by the true government in the
secondperiod, social welfare under time—consistent policy is given by:
W V(p1,11) +
whereIis consumption expenditureinperiod1valued at domestic price p1,
and22isconsumption expenditure in period 2 valued at the world (and true
domestic) price, one.
The representative household maximizes expected utility, given prior









whereR (p1 -1)cand (p —l)c
,inequilibrium. Planned
consumption of good 2 in period 2 in the event of a tariff in period 2 is
equal to c. The superscript refers to the second good.12is consumption
expenditurevaluedat domestic prices if there were a tariff.Thecurrent
account deficit in period 1 is given by x.
We now assume that the utility from current period consumptionis
homotheticand displays constant relative risk aversion. Indirectutilityin
each period is given by:
V(p,I)
14where V(p)< 0 andCT>0. Also we define
a (p—1)c2/I,
wherethe superscript 2 refers to the second good, sothatexpenditures
measuredin world prices and measured in domestic prices for the same
consumption bundle ar-a related by
z =(1—a)J.
The first-order conditions for household optimization yield:
(10) (z2/z1)CT(1-a) +
ifp11 (i.e., free trade is chosen in period 1) and
(11) (z2/z1)C =(1—)[v(1)/v(p)]1(1—a)+n,
if p1p (i.e., the tariff is imposed in period 1).
The values of the true government's objective function are:
(12) W1(n)(t1)B)1
[i + ((1_)/a)] [i +
forfree trade in period 1,
and
(13) W()(v(1)B)1
[7 ((1_a)/a)] [i +
forthe tariffinperiod1,
where =(z2/z1)a,in the presence of free trade,
'p =(z2/z1)°,in the presence of the tariff,
r [(v(p)/(1-a)(1)]',and By(l +(1+r)).We have used the fact
15that
z1B (1 + $1I0).4fori i,p.
It is useful to notice that (7—1)1(1--a) is a measure of the atemporal
welfare loss from a tariff since this quantity equals
1-a 1-0
[(P(p)I) —(i.'(l)z) ]/(1—a),
which is the difference between the utility for some given level of
expendituremeasuredat world prices when a tariff is in place and when it is
not.This quantitymustbe negative.
For manycases,equations (10) and(11)implythatif ITisbetween zero
andone,then expenditure measuredatworld prices will be less (greater) in
period2than in period1when free trade (the tariff) is adopted in period1.
Thepossibility existsthat theopposite effectsoccur for particular
combinations of tariff magnitude,elasticity of substitution between
commodities,and coefficient of relative risk aversion, as long as the latter
isgreater than unity.In suchinstances, social welfare with the tariff,
W(It),ismonotonically decreasing in ,sothatfreetrade in period0is
superior to the tarifffor all values of U.Therefore, we restrict our
attention th cases in which z1 is greater than z2 if free trade is adopted in
period 1, so that free trade leads to a current account deficit inthe first
period, as in the one-good model. That is, we restrict attention to casesin
which 7(1—a) < 1. This will always hold if '7isless than one.
W1(lt) is monotonically decreasing inUandhas a derivative equal to
zero for Iequalto zero. However, W(1() has a maximum value for some value
of 11betweenzero and one.
Because the static distortion is created by tariffs, free trade may be
16superior to the tariff for all prior beliefs about the government's type.
if the tariff is superior to free trade for some possible beliefs, then
those values of lr for which it is the optimal policy all exceed one—half.
This follows from the one—good model, since the presence of the atemporal
welfare effect can only reduce the benefits of tariff imposition. Figures
2(a)and 2(b) display curves W1(lr)andW(m)forto possible cases.
Proposition 2: The least prior value of 71 between 0 and 1 such that W1 ()z
W2(lr),if it exists, under Bayesian learning exceeds the prior such that
W1(lt*) =W2(1T*)inthe absence of learning.
Proof:BecauseW(i) is not monotonically increasing in i,theargument for
Proposition1 is insufficient. The possibility arises that W1(*)W(71) for
values of and. i less than However, if q > 1/2, then the Bayesian
— A
uplatingrules imply that71 >iiWheneverq 1/2, free tradeinthe first
period is superior to the tariff for the true government (11mustbelessthan
1/2). Since W1(71) > W(ir) for any ir<ifW1(a1) W2(112)forsome 1' 2
< u, then > Any other possibility is ruled out because W1(71) is
monotonically decreasing. Therefore, 11> implies that 11mustexceed11,j
> >
The two-period model can be extended to an arbitrarily long finite
horizon or an infinite horizon model. With learning, each period that the
true government chooses its optimal policy, the prior belief that it is the
false typeisreduced. This is truewhether theoptimal policy is free trade
or tariff imposition in any given period.If tariff imposition is optimal
given the initial prior, then, in the absence of learning, it will alwaysbe
theoptimal policy until the last period (or always, if the horizon is
17infinite.) However, when the household updates its beliefs about the
government's typeafterobserving the policy chosen each period, ifthe
horizon is long enough free trade will eventually become the optimal policy
choice.This is true even when the tariffisthe best policy in early
periods.
Themulti-period extension of the model is straightforward. The
household maximizes
E8tV(Pt,
with respect to consumption expenditures subject to
￿E((R
+
where -1)4and8(1-r)1. The expectation is taken with respect
to the sequence of domestic relative prices, which are random
variables for the incredulous household. The household knows the objective of
the true government (but assesses less than probability one to the government
being this type), so that it can calculate the pathofpolicies chosen by both
the true type andfalsetype recognizing how its ownbeliefswill be updated.
At time T,thetrue.government's objective is given by
wTtTtt
where is the actualconsumptionexpenditure of the household given the
policies chosen. The government selects a policy sequence, whichis
the optimal time consistent one given the updating rules and initial (time 0)
18priors of the private sector. The horizon T can be infinity.
TheBayesianupdatingrules are unchanged.Bach period that thetrue
governmentchooses the policywhich is optimal, the prior belief, A,of the
household that itisthe true type rises.For a given initial prior, A,,
greater than zero, the number of periods for the prior, A, to decline to any
value less than unity is finite.Therefore, even if the tariff is optimal
initially, for a large enough T, free trade will becomeasuperior policy in a
boundednumberof periods and it will be selected thereafter.This is
summarized as:
Proposition3For the infinite horizon problem, if .,>0,thenunberof
periodssuch that the tariff is the optimal policy is bounded by a finite
number K. K willdependupon the parameters of the model.
ProofIf (l—A0)qis zero, then the first-best is achieved by the policy
sequence, {pi}o.
Let q > 0, and denote the value of social welfare under
this policy of free trade as a function of o' W(10).Furthennore, for any
alternative policy sequence, ttO' such that 3 t < for which =p,the
value of social welfare is strictly less than W(A0) for A01. Strict
concavity and twice-continuous differentiability of U(c1,c2) imply that
is continuous in A0. Continuity of W therefore implies there exists AX < 1
such that W(A0) > for all A > X, where the policy generatingis =
pand 1, 'V't ￿1.This implies that given At > AX, at any time t, the
optimal time—consistent policy thereafter is free trade as long as A > for
all s ￿t.This condition holds by the Bayesian updating rules which imply
that both X and A exceed A. ,theprior: s p s—i
A 1/[q(1 —A1)+ A1], and
19- X51)+X51].
Thedynamicbehaviorof the current account can be inferredin the normal
case we consider (that is, an anticipated future tariff induces a current
accountdeficit).If the tariff is a superior policy given initial prior
beliefs,than a current account surplus occurs sincethere is a perceived
positive probability that free trade will be chosen in a subsequent period.
As the prior probability that the government is the false type falls with
learning, the intertemporal distortion created by the tariff increases and the
current account surplus rises. Once free trade becomes optimal, the current
account goes into deficit because the private sector perceives a positive
probability of a tariff the next period.With learning, this probability
declines, so that the current account deficit falls toward zero.Since the
optimal saving path followed by the economy depends upon the initial prior
beliefs of the household, the steady-state wealth and consumption also depends
upon the initial priors.
5. Conclusion
When a government isin power thatwishesto maximizethewelfare of
consumers,but the consumers do not believe that is the government's goal, a
distortion is introduced inth the economy.In the models we have examined,
the misperception is about future tariff policy. The incredulity of
households creates an intertemporal distortion.
Afirst—bestpolicy to remove this distortion -—suchas a ta on foreign
20borrowing --isnot available to the government. As a second-best policy it
may be desirable to impose a tariff, if the atemporal distortion is smaller
than the intertemporal distortion.
The optimizing government cannot reach the first-best solution under the
constraints we have postulated. Therefore, even when it implements the best
policy among the ones it has at its disposal, a distortion remains. However,
we have shown that the mere act of choosing policy optimally over time reduces
the size of the externality. This is true even if the optimal policy is to
choose a tariff currently. By acting optimally, the government establishes
credibility, A government cannot achieve credibility instantaneously —-it
must do so over time by choosing the policy which is best for the public. The
public will begin to recognize the benificence of the government, even if it
is imposing a tariff, if that tariff is the best choice the government can
make.(The ironyis that the skepticism cfthepubliciswhatforces the
governmentto choose a tariff, and is what keeps the economy away from an
unconstrained Pareto optimum.)
The presence of learning generally weakens the case for a tariff as a
policy to deal with the interteniporal distortion caused by household's
incredulity.First, the public must initially be more skeptical about the
goodintentions of the government (ascompared to the case without learning)
for itto be optimal to impose a tariff. Second, over time with learning it
is inevitable that free trade becomes the best policy.
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